Document 39

Page 1 of 8

Filed 06/30/2008

Case 3:07-cv-03019-CRB

## CHARLES J. FLEISHMAN

Lawyer a professional corporation 19839 Nordhoff St. Northridge, CA 91324 telephone (818)350-6285; fax (818)350-6272 erisa@erisarights.com

June 13, 2008

Rebecca Hull SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN et al. One Market Plaza Steuart Tower, 8th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105

Re: Chellino v. Kaiser

Dear Ms. Hull:

Enclosed herewith is a proposed Statement of Proceedings regarding the judge's order putting off discovery until after motions for summary judgment would be heard. There was no court reported at the initial case management conference and the court's minute orders do not reflect the order. Under FRAP 10(c) you have 10 days to serve objections or propose amendments.

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please call me. Mr. Westheimer was present at the conference. You may wish to contact him.

Very truly yours,

Charles J. Fleishman enc.

CASE NO. C 07-03019 CRB

SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD LLP REBECCA A. HULL Bar No. 99802 One Market Plaza Steuart Tower, 8th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: (415) 781-7900 Facsimile: (415) 781-2635 Attorneys for Defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., and Kaiser Permanente Welfare Benefit Plan UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CASE NO. C 07-03019 CRB MARIE CHELLINO, **DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO** Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS [FRAP 10] KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC., AND DOES 1-10, Defendant. Defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("KFHP") and Kaiser Permanente Welfare Benefit Plan ("Plan") object to plaintiff Marie Chellino's proposed statement of proceedings ("proposed statement") served on June 13, 2008. Plaintiff's proposed statement is not an accurate reflection of the proceedings in question, and should be rejected by the Court. Plaintiff's proposed statement asserts that at the October 5, 2007, case management conference, the Court "ordered" that no discovery could take place until after summary judgment motions had been heard. There is in fact no such "order" in the record. Presumably, plaintiff wishes to argue to the Ninth Circuit (to which she has appealed from the judgment entered against her) that she was improperly precluded from conducting discovery. Plaintiff's characterization of the October 5, 2007, proceeding must be rejected. As the 28 Court will recall, the subject of discovery arose because plaintiff had served some discovery

1

06/23/2008 04:38:26 Case 3:07-cv-

4

7

10

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27 28 prematurely, in advance of the early meeting of counsel required by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the parties reached an understanding that the discovery that had been served was ineffective; this issue was discussed in the parties' joint CMC statement.

At the CMC, plaintiff's counsel argued that discovery should be freely allowed, and the Court disagreed. The Court did not, however, "order" that "no discovery" was allowed prior to the summary judgment motion hearing. Rather, the Court advised plaintiff's counsel that he should first review the administrative record (which had just been provided to him) and that the parties then should try to work out any differences they might have with regard to discovery, if plaintiff continued to believe that discovery would be appropriate.<sup>1</sup>

Defendants object to the proposed "statement of proceedings" for the further reason that the provisions of Fed. R. App. Pro. 10(c) do not appear applicable to failure of the Court to reduce an alleged order to writing. Rather, it appears that 10(c) provides for a "statement of the evidence" when there is no transcript. Plaintiff has not indicated whether she has tried to obtain a transcript of the CMC, which would answer any question she might have. In any case, however, Rule 10(c) applies to an absence of documentation regarding "evidence," and plaintiff's proposed "statement of proceedings" has nothing to do with "evidence." Defendants contend that Rule 10(c) does not authorize creation of orders after the fact, when no order in fact was issued.

For the reasons set forth above, defendants object to plaintiff's characterization of the proceedings held on October 5, 2007.

DATED: June 23, 2008

SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD LLP

Attorneys for Defendants

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., and Kaiser

Permanente Welfare Benefit Plan

¹ Plaintiff's summary judgment motion ultimately pointed to no issue on which discovery assertedly was needed. Her opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion, at page 4 n. 1, stated that the Court had "ordered that there be no discovery until after the summary judgment motions are heard" but went on to suggest that such discovery would be needed only if the Court wished to see "more evidence" regarding the alleged bias of the reviewing doctors.

## CHARLES J. FLEISHMAN

Bar# 46405
A Professional Corporation
19839 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, California 91324
erisa@erisarights.com
Telephone: (818) 350-6285
FAX: (818) 350-6272
Attorney for Plaintiff

MARIE CHELLINO

vs.

a corporation; DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Plaintiff,

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, Inc

Defendants.

6

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15 16

17

18

19

20 21

22

2324

25

26

27 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NO. C07-3019 CRB

DECLARATION OF CHARLES FLEISHMAN RE STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS (FRAP 10c)

Judge Charles R. Breyer

)

- I, Charles J. Fleishman, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law before all the courts of this state and am the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the present action.

DECLARATION OF CHARLES J. FLEISHMAN

- 2. I appeared at the CMC. Appearing for the defendant at the CMC was Michael Westheimer alone. I spoke with him on the telephone on June 24, 2008 at which time he told me that he had no recollection of the events of the CMC. Rebecca Hull was not present at the CMC.
- 3. At the CMC, the court told the parties to do nothing further with regard to discovery until after summary judgment motions were heard. There appears to be no written record of this.

2.0

- 4. I attempted to order a transcript of the CMC for the record on appeal but was told that there was no court reported present and that there is no recording of the proceeding.
- 5. The defendant has objected to the plaintiff's proposed Statement of Proceeding (FRAP 10(c)) on the grounds that there is no order in the record telling the parties to refrain from discovery until after summary judgments are heard. It is because there is no written order in the record that there is a need to supplement the record. If the fact that no record of an event exists were a valid objection to supplementing the record under FRAP 10c, FRAP 10c would be superfluous.
- 6. The defendant's objection to the proposed Statement of Proceeding states that I argued that discovery should be "freely allowed." I never argued such a thing in this ERISA case. I don't remember any significant discussions at the CMC regarding discover at all. All I remember is the Court's telling the parties to wait until after summary judgment motions before doing discovery. The Joint Case Management Statement makes it clear that the only evidence that the plaintiff was seeking outside of the administrative record was evidence regarding defendant's possible conflict of interest. See paragraph 6 of the Joint Case Management Statement. Further, since the only representative of the defendant present at the CMC has no memory of the details of that hearing, the defendant's claim that I argued that discovery should be "freely allowed" can be best described as fantasy.
- 7. The defendant claims in its objection that the plaintiff's interrogatories, served before the CMC, were agreed by the parties to have been ineffective. This is not true. The parties agreed that the interrogatories would "be deemed served on the date that the parties conduct the early meeting of counsel pursuant to FRCP 26(f), and that the due date for defendant to serve responses is 30 days after that date." Exhibit 1. The defendant never served responses, neither answers nor objections, and the plaintiff never filed a motion to compel answers. This is

because both sides heard and followed the Court's admonition to refrain from discovery until after summary judgment motions were heard.

- 8. Defendant writes, in its objection, that "Plaintiff's summary judgment motion ultimately pointed to no issue on which discovery assertedly was needed." This statement ignores footnote 1 of the plaintiff's Opposition to [Defendant's] Motion for Summary Judgment where, in response to a claim that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of the defendant's doctors' bias, plaintiff wrote, "The court has ordered that there be no discovery until after motions for summary judgment are heard. If the court feels that more evidence is required regarding the bias of Aetna's doctors, discovery in the form of depositions should be allowed."
- 9. Finally, defendants object on the grounds that FRAP 10c only applies to "evidence" and the proposed Statement of Proceeding does not seek to add evidence to the record on appeal. A reading of the statute shows that it apples to "evidence or proceedings."

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this June 30, 2008 at Northridge, California.

J. Fleishman



One Market Plaza Steuart Tower, 8th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Tel: 415.781.7900 Fax: 415.781.2635

www.sdma.com

July 30, 2007

VIA FACSIMILE, CONFIRMED BY U.S. MAIL

Charles J. Fleishman 8383 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1030 Beverly Hills, California 90211-2495

Re:

Marie Chellino v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. C-07-03019 CRB

Our File No.: 322-8087

## Dear Mr. Fleishman:

In our teleconference on Friday, July 27, 2007, regarding the interrogatories that plaintiff served in the above-referenced action, we discussed that the discovery is objectionable under FRCP 26(d) because the parties have not yet conducted the early meeting of counsel required by FRCP 26(f). This will confirm our agreement during the teleconference that plaintiff's interrogatories shall be deemed served on the date that the parties conduct the early meeting of counsel pursuant to FRCP 26(f), and that the due date for defendant to serve responses is 30 days after that date.

Thank you for your courtesy in this matter.

Regards,

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP

MNW/mmm

SF/1433141v1